True, this is a cliche - the hard-pressed general fighting the enemy and the political forces of his own homeland - but all cliches have kernels of truth in them. U.S. Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur found himself in the same situation during the Korean War, and he ended up being fired by then President Harry Truman for insubordination. Similar to MacArthur, Clark is a bit too zealous and wants the military to have the majority of control during wartime.
Clark, now retired and living in Little Rock, Ark., was supreme allied commander of NATO European forces from 1997 to 2000. In March 1999, Yugoslav (mostly Serbian) military units steamrolled into the country's own province of Kosovo - the equivalent of battalions of U.S. military soldiers barrelling into Pittsburgh - with the full intent of continuing the concept of 'ethnic cleansing,' which was a generic term for genocide, against all who the Serbs thought were ungovernable.
Thus, Clark found himself in charge of 19 different NATO nations' military forces. An 11-week air bombardment campaign against the Yugoslavs convinced them to give up their attempts to take Kosovo. Much of the credit for the NATO victory can be attributed to Clark.
Yet, despite knowing the region's mores and culture and also the fact that he was the leading military negotiator for the Bosnian Peace Accords at Dayton in 1995, the general had to engage in behind-the-scenes squabbles when he made suggestions on cities and sites that should be bombed by the allies.
Two people who gave the general trouble, as recorded in 'Waging Modern War,' were former Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Gen. Hugh Shelton, ex-Joint of Chiefs of Staff chairman. Together, both men made Clark's life hell. If 'war is hell,' what is war and personality conflicts between leaders, which Clark believes he had to deal with dailyâ¢
Here are two examples of problems that Clark had with Shelton and Cohen.
Clark recounted that Shelton told him to 'just keep bombing' when Javier Solana, the secretary general of NATO, told Clark 'not to bomb in or near cities.'
When Shelton told Clark to 'forget about the (bombing) targets in Kosovo and go after targets in northern Serbia,' Clark responded, 'I don't have enough of those targets. We'll have to hit them (the Serbs) whenever we can, but I can't just strike in the north.'
While this may seem like petty quibbling to a civilian, this conflict between the two generals is a prime example of Clark's stalwart thesis in 'Waging Modern War': that the civilian and military leaders of the 19 NATO countries wanted a quick end to the war without soiling their own names and resumes. In war, somebody has to be responsible for issuing orders, and Clark makes the somewhat shocking point that even he - as allied supreme commandeer - was not always 100 percent sure who was giving him certain orders during the 11-week military conflict.
Clark's feelings toward Shelton are lukewarm at best, and his true feelings toward Cohen appear even cooler. In Chapter 5, titled 'Carrots and Sticks,' the general tells of a telephone call that he received from Cohen.
The secretary of defense, reading from a briefing dossier, asked Clark, 'And does that sound familiar?'
'Well, sir, it sounds like something I might have seen,' said Clark.
'This is the paper you wrote and sent to (former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard) Holbrooke. And I've told you before, you don't give military advice to Holbrooke,' Cohen said in a cold voice.
Clark responded, 'No sir, I don't remember writing any paper' and, in fact, he did not. Cohen had read Clark a report from Mohammed Sacribey, the Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations, and Cohen, ready to pounce, accused Clark of writing the paper. Again it's a seemingly small item, but as Clark writes, 'It was another reminder of the relationships in Washington, and their impact on my activities in Europe. It was also an indicator that some in Washington didn't really understand the web of relationships and full array of policies that flowed through the SACEUR's (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; he is also the American Commander in Chief, European Command, for NATO) position.'
The book is littered with military acronyms, and the reader is strongly advised to read the list of abbreviations pages at the front of the book before diving into 'Waging Modern War.'
Clark is not infallible - he has a healthy dose of ego - and he may see himself as a great military leader caught up in a real-life Shakespearian-like tragedy of errors. This is so much so that he has a cast of characters section at the beginning of 'Waging Modern War.'
In a book by one of the major American military leaders of recent times, there are, surprisingly, few maps in 'Waging Modern War.' There are maps on the frontpiece and the backpiece of this memoir, but maps at vital points in the book - for example of a city that will be bombed and thus described by Clark - would have been helpful to the reader.
'In war, you don't just lose,' writes the general in the Introduction, 'Not if you're a commander. It's what MacArthur told Maj. Gen. Robert Eichelberger in New Guinea in 1942: 'Take Buna, or don't come back alive.''
MacArthur really believed that statement, but he was involved in a world war, not a regional skirmish like Clark. Nonetheless, Clark believes in the 'live-and-win; lose-and-die' theory of wartime fighting. Later in the Introduction, Clark writes, 'As a first-year cadet at West Point, in 1962, I was required to memorize General MacArthur's words and recite them again and again. There is one single message, one sole idea, written in red on every beachhead from Australia to Tokyo: 'There is no substitute for victory!''
Like MacArthur, who clearly is one of Clark's heroes, Clark had a brilliant academic record at West Point and was also a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University in England.
He stuns the reader when he opines that NATO's 'lack of preparedness when conflict actually began ... is likely to be a pattern we will see again, despite all efforts.' Why⢠Because negotiating, compromising, and continuing dialogue with possible enemies, when there is a threat that NATO and non-NATO countries may next meet on a battlefield, puts the need for military readiness low on the agendas of world leaders.
The importance of unity in command, in multinational coalitions, is also stressed by Clark. So is the fact that civilian and military leaders of a country should work in tandem, not antagonize each other, when the country is involved in a war.
Clark's theory that modern communications media can make a military general's life difficult is fascinating reading. How will such modern communications affect a wartime general's decisions⢠CNN and Web site broadcasts make it possible for viewers to see the results of those decisions shortly after they are made. It's a fascinating ethical problem, and Clark writes about it in clear, gripping prose.
While Clark has a theoretical mind and is an outstanding general, he shares a scary trait with his hero, MacArthur: Clark would have the military lead forces during wartime - not elected civilian politicians. How both generals - both well-schooled in American history - can miss this fundamental beam of U.S. democracy is baffling.
Mark Weisenmiller is a Lutz, Fla., free-lance writer for the Tribune-Review.
